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Citizen's Privacy and Data Banks: 
Enforcement of the Standards in the 
Data Protection Act 1984 (U.K.) 
Jeremy MCBRIDE * 
En 1981, le Royaume-Uni ratifiait la Convention européenne pour la 
protection des individus relativement aux fichiers personnels informatisés. Le 
Parlement vient de donner effet à cette convention en droit interne en adoptant 
le Data Protection Act, 1984. Le présent article a pour but de critiquer les 
points saillants de cette Loi, et en particulier l'institution du Registraire. 
L'auteur met l'accent sur les droits fondamentaux protégés par la Loi, ses 
mécanismes de mise en oeuvre ainsi que sur les différents recours que peuvent 
instituer les citoyens en vertu de cette Loi. 
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Introduction 
The Data Protection Act has just completed its second journey through 
the parliamentary processes (the first attempt was interrupted by the 
dissolution of Parliament for the general election last year) '. In the course of 
* Lecturer, Faculty of Law, University of Birmingham. 
1. The first Data Protection Bill was introduced in the House of Lords on 21st December 1982 
and the second on 23rd June 1983. 
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its progress through Parliament, there was hardly any change to the 
enforcement provisions proposed by the government and the criticism 
levelled at them was relatively muted. The controversy which has surrounded 
what is now the Data Protection Act has been primarily concerned with its 
substantive provisions — what sort of data is to be protected and against 
what the protection is required, as well as the question of what exemptions 
from the Act's provisions should be permitted2. It is not intended to go into 
this area but it is necessary to say something about the background to the 
Act as that does afford some explanation for the enforcement scheme that 
has been adopted. 
In essence, the story of data protection in the U.K. is one of marked 
reluctance by the government to act even thought the problems had been 
identified as long ago as the 1950s and early 1960s, with attempts in the 
House of Lords to introduce general privacy legislation3. As concern grew, 
the Younger Committee was set up to examine the need for legislation 
against intrusions into privacy by private persons. In the area of data 
protection it favoured building upon existing concepts with the addition of 
a new wrong of unauthorised disclosure but no legislation was forth-
coming4. The widespread introduction of computers gave rise to much 
greater concern and with the Lindop Committee in 1978, there was a 
thorough examination of the problem of data protection itself as opposed to 
the previous more generalised studies of the protection of privacy5. This 
Committee was also concerned with both public and private records, a 
recognition that the threat came from government as well as other individuals 
and private corporations. Lindop recommended the establishment of an 
authority to regulate the storage and disclosure of personal data. It took the 
view that the burden of enforcement should not be on the individual who 
would not have sufficient expertise and resources6. In particular it wanted a 
body with wide powers of investigation, to call witnesses and documents, 
and it would have been able to find breaches of the relevant standards, 
require change of practice and seek injunctions for this purpose, where 
necessary, and it would also have had the power to prosecute data users who 
did not take the appropriate action. The scheme was envisaged as being 
preventative rather than remedial and it made only limited proposals for 
civil actions by the data subject himself. It considered that with the « careful 
administration and the enforcement » of its scheme it would be unusual for a 
2. See, for example, the N.C.C.L. Briefing Paper, Data Protection Bill 1983, London, 1983. 
3. See, R. Wacks, The Protection of Privacy, London, 1980, p. 4-10. 
4. Report of the Committee on Privacy, Cmnd. 5012 (1972) (Chairman : Kenneth Younger). 
5. Report of the Committee on Data Protection, Cmnd. 7341 (1978) (Chairman: Sir Norman 
Lindop). 
6. Id.,c. 19. 
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data subject to suffer damage. The Committee proposed, however, that a 
data subject should be able to recover compensation from a user for any 
ascertainable damage which he could prove he had suffered as the foreseeable 
result of the user's automatic handling of personal information about the 
data subject in breach of the relevant Code of Practice7. 
These proposals were not, however, met by any government initiatives 
and indeed after the customary period of consultation required following the 
production of a report by a committee which had canvassed views widely, 
there was then a government in power which had no sympathy with 
independent administrative agencies or quangos. Although procrastination 
became the order of the day, legislation ultimately proved impossible to 
avoid : a consequence of developments within the Council of Europe which 
galvanised the computer industry in the U.K. into calling for reform in an 
unholy alliance with the National Council for Civil Liberties. Although the 
right to privacy is protected by Article 8 of the Council of Europe's European 
Convention on Human Rights there has been no significant case-law 
developments in this area and in any event this was seen as a subject 
requiring a special treaty, which was adopted in 1981 : the European 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the automatic 
processing of Personal Data*. As a member of the Council of Europe there 
would be informal pressure on the U.K. to ratify it, but more significantly 
the fact that many other European countries were prepared to ratify it was 
the cause of considerable concern for the computer industry in this country ; 
the Convention (as well as a number of domestic laws of European states 
predating it) does not permit transborder flows of data to countries which 
do not have any comparable data protection legislation9. These developments 
were a serious threat to the data processing industry and legislation was thus 
essential if their commercial interests were to be protected. The Act 
purports, therefore, to implement the provisions of the Convention — a 
necessary preliminary to ratification by the U.K. — but at most it is an 
attempt only to do the minimum required. This is true of the exemptions 
permitted ; the unwillingness to take up the option to apply the proposed 
protection to manual files as well as to computerised or automatic systems 10 
and it may also be an appropriate comment in the enforcement machinery 
which is going to be established. 
The Act has established the office of a Data Protection Registrar (rather 
than an Authority but the constant reassurance has been that he will be a 
7. W.,c. 33. 
8. E.T.S. No. 108(1981). 
9. Id, art. 12. 
10. W.,art. 3(2)(c). 
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person of distinction) who will have a number of specific powers over those 
who use information kept on automatic systems and the backing of these 
powers with a criminal sanction certainly gives the impression that they have 
substance. Another initial impression is that there should be simplicity of 
operation in marked contrast to bodies such as the Equal Opportunities 
Commission (EOC) and the Commission for Racial Equality (CRE). The 
Registrar can do more than they can and the terms in which he is given the 
power to act do not include any express reference to the sort of preliminaries 
to action which have slowed down and entangled the CRE ". The appearance 
of simplicity may, however, be deceiving both in that it will not prevent 
constraints being read into the legislation and that there is actually an 
inadequate power base on which he can act. Thus it is quite possible that 
some «due process» limitations will have to be read into the Registrar's 
powers, although what exactly these will be will have to await the outcome of 
challenges to their exercise some time in the future. Moreover, the relative 
simplicity of the terms in which the Registrar's powers are expressed — 
saying generally that he can act when « satisfied » about a particular matter 
but without having any express provision about how that state of satisfaction 
is to be attained — may actually mean that he does not have appropriate 
investigative powers to be able to invoke his formidable enforcement 
powers. Furthermore the Act does contain a degree of jurisdictional 
complexity which may prove a hindrance in the long term ; thus there is a 
tribunal system for appeals against decisions by the Registrar ; the criminal 
courts will be used where those decisions are not respected but the ordinary 
civil courts will be the forum for the victim of any violation of the standards 
laid down by the Act ; and there is also a good chance that the Divisional 
Court may also be involved as judicial review by the person using the data or 
by the person who is the subject of the data is by no means out of the 
question. 
I. The 1984 Act and the Data Protection Principles 
The Act is concerned with personal data, that is data consisting of 
information relating to a living individual who can be identified from the 
information, including any expression of opinion about the individual12. For 
the purposes of the Act the individual is referred to as the « data subject» 
and the person holding the data is the « data user»13. Although we are not 
II. See, G. Applebey, « The Commission for Racial Equality and the "Spiders Web" »,(1982) 1 
C.J.Q. 301. 
12. S. 1(3). 
13. S. 1(4) and (5). The Act also applies to those who provide data processing services for 
others in what are termed a « computer bureau » ; s. 1(6). 
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concerned with the applicability of the standards protecting such data — 
there are broad exemptions for national security and the police as well as 
matter relating to the appointment of the judiciary 14 — it is important to 
bear in mind the standards themselves — known as the « data protection 
principles», because their observance is what the enforcement machinery 
should have as its goal and should, therefore, actually be capable of 
achieving. The principles themselves follow the Council of Europe Conven-
tion and in general terms embody the standards usually considered appro-
priate in this area. The data protection principles are set out in the First 
Schedule and are as follows : 
1. information should be obtained lawfully and be processed fairly and 
lawfully ; 
2. it should only be held for one or more specified purposes ; 
3. it should not be used or disclosed in a manner incompatible with that 
purpose or purposes ; 
4. it should be adequate, relevant and not excessive in relation to the 
specified purpose or purposes ; 
5. it should be accurate and kept up to date ; 
6. it should not be kept longer than necessary ; 
7. an individual should be entitled to know whether data is held about 
him, to have access to it and, where appropriate, to have it corrected 
or erased ; and finally, in the case of people running computer 
bureaux ; 
8. there should be adequate security measures. 
Some elaboration of these principles is given in the second part of the 
schedule — a form of authoritative interpretation and although helpful, this 
is unlikely to eliminate the problems of applying the principles in particular 
situations143. 
If these principles are to be observed by all data users — and it should 
be said that some already do respect them voluntarily — then there has to be 
an effective mechanism for checking the contents and use of data systems. 
The scale of the problem is vast and part of it is not actually knowing how 
many systems there are — estimates vary from the Home Office's cautious 
80000 to other estimates which may seem extravagant, varying as they do 
between 300000 and half a million, but which in reality may be quite 
14. S. 26-35. 
14a. The principles can also be modified by the Home Secretary to provide additional 
safeguards in relation to personal data concerning the data subjects racial origin, political 
opinions, religious or other beliefs, physical or mental health or sexual life and criminal 
convictions ; s. 2(3). 
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accurate given the very high level of computer sales in the U.K.15 Whatever 
the figure, it is unlikely that most data subjects will have the enthusiasm or 
the tenacity to use the access provision to discover the information held 
about them or to bring civil proceedings against those discovered to have 
violated the data protection principles. It would be almost impossible for 
any individual to calculate who might have information about him ; in most 
cases anyway it is only likely to become an issue of importance to the 
individual when an adverse decision is taken in respect of him and the 
explanation, which may not actually be given to him, is that it was on the 
basis of information obtained or held by the decision-maker. If he gets to 
know of it then he might want a remedy but it is much more likely that he 
won't get to know of it, and in any event, if the data protection principles 
were being observed then the problem should not have arisen. 
In view of the nature and scope of the problem, the Lindop Committee 
was surely right to concentrate on the preventative as opposed to the 
remedial action that should be taken, without, of course, ruling out 
individual remedies in particular cases. The Data Protection Act undoubtedly 
embodies this bifurcated approach but the civil remedies for the individual 
may have a larger role in data protection than might be imagined, although 
this is still very much a case of crystal-ball gazing as the Act's actual entry 
into force remains uncertain. This is because the date of commencement is 
left to be determined by the Home Secretary and even then the enforcement 
powers will not generally become operational until some two years after 
that16. 
2. The Enforcement Machinery 
Under the Act, the introduction of a registration requirement for all 
data users covered by its provision is the crucial first stage of the enforcement 
scheme ". The register will contain the name and address of the data user; a 
description of the data and the purposes for which it is held ; a description of 
the sources from which it is or will be obtained ; a description of the persons 
to whom it may be disclosed ; the countries to which it may be transferred 
and the address for the receipt of requests from data subjects for access to 
the data. It is an offence to hold such personal data without being registered 
or to disregard any provisions about the use of the data given in the register, 
e.g. to hold data other than that specified or to use it for an unspecified 
15. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Eighth Sitting, 1 March 
1984, col. 233. 
16. S. 42. 
17. S. 4 and 5. 
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purpose 18. The register will thus be the starting point for any individual 
seeking to learn about the data systems which may contain information 
about him and will also be the starting point for the monitoring activities to 
be undertaken by the Registrar. 
The register has to be available for inspection by members of the public 
at all reasonable hours without charge although a charge can be made for a 
certified copy of the particulars contained in an entry in it19. It is possible to 
update one's entry in the register20 and in any event entries must be renewed 
periodically — the precise period will be fixed by the Home Secretary but it 
will not be less than three yearly intervals21. Registration is not, however 
automatic ; the application can be accepted or rejected by the Registrar, but 
he can only do the latter where (a) he considers that the particulars proposed 
for registration will not give sufficient information as to the matters to which 
they relate ; or (b) he is satisfied that the applicant is likely to contravene any 
of the data protection principles ; or (c) he considers that the information 
available to him is insufficient to satisfy him that the principles are not likely 
to be contravened22. 
In addition to his power over registration, the Registrar is also given a 
number of supervisory powers to ensure that the data protection principles 
are being observed by data users whose applications for registration have 
been accepted, namely the power to issue enforcement, deregistration and 
transfer prohibition notices. 
The Registrar can serve an enforcement notice if he is satisfied that a 
registered person has contravened or is contravening any of the data 
protection principles and this notice can require him to take, within such 
time as is specified in the notice such steps as are so specified for complying 
with the principle or principles in question23. There must clearly be a 
relationship between the steps and the principles but the section seems to 
leave it to the Registrar to work out what are appropriate steps, although it 
does state that where it is a matter of inaccuracy the Registrar can require 
rectification or erasure of the data concerned, or the addition of a statement 
that the data subject regards the information as incorrector misleading, and 
where it is a case of the access principle not being observed then he must be 
satisfied that a request has actually been refused24. In deciding to serve the 
18. S. 5(5). The restrictions also apply to the servants and agents of the data user ; S. 5(3). 
19. S. 9. 
20. S. 6(3) and (4). It is also an offence for the data user not to apply for the updating of his 
address or to supply false or misleading information ; S. 6(4) and (5). 
21. S. 8. 
22. S. 7. 
23. S. 10. 
24. S. 10(3) and (4). 
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notice he must consider whether the contravention has caused or is likely to 
cause any person damage or distress and the notice must state the principles 
he is satisfied have been or are being contravened and his reasons for 
reaching that conclusion25. It is an offence not to comply with an enforcement 
notice although it is a defence to prove that one exercised all due diligence to 
comply with it26. 
If the Registrar is satisfied that the principles have been or are being 
contravened and that compliance cannot be adequately secured by the 
service of an enforcement notice then he can serve the registered person with 
a deregistration notice, notifying him that he will remove the particulars 
concerning that person from the register at the end of a specified period27. 
Again the Registrar must consider whether the contravention has caused or 
is likely to cause damage or distress to any person and he must state the 
principles being contravened and his reasons for reaching that conclusion 
and deciding that compliance cannot be adequately secured by the service of 
an enforcement notice28. The effect of deregistration is, of course, to make 
the holding and use of the data by the data user a criminal offence. 
Finally the Registrar can issue what is known as a transfer prohibition 
notice where it appears that a data user proposes to transfer personal data to 
a place outside the U.K. and he is satisfied either that the transfer is likely to 
contravene or will lead to a contravention of the data protection principles if 
the place is a country not a party to the Convention or, in the case of a 
country party to the Convention, that there will be a further transfer to 
another country not a party and the principles will be contravened or a 
breach of any additional principles that the Home Secretary has laid down 
relating to the racial origin of the data subject, his political opinions or 
religious or other beliefs, his physical or mental health or his sexual life or his 
criminal convictions29. In issuing the notice, which will prohibit any transfer 
either absolutely or until steps specified in the notice are taken, the Registrar 
must again consider whether it is needed to prevent damage or distress to 
any person and must also have regard to the general desirability of 
facilitating the free transfer of data between the U.K. and other states and 
territories 30. The notice must specify the time when it is to take effect and 
contains the principles which the Registrar is satisfied are likely to be 
25. S. 10(2) and (5). 
26. S. 10(9). 
27. S. 11. 
28. S. 11(2) and (3). 
29. CI. 12. Seefn. 14a supra. 
30. S. 12(4). 
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contravened and his reasons for reaching that conclusion31. It is an offence 
not to comply with the notice, although there is again a defence of proving 
that one exercised all due diligence to avoid a contravention32. 
All refusals of registration and all notices, enforcement, deregistration 
and transfer prohibitions, served by the Registrar must contain particulars of 
the data users' rights of appeal to the Data Protection Tribunal33. In general 
no refusal or notice will take effect during the period in which an appeal can 
be lodged or while an appeal is considered, although in cases or urgency, the 
Registrar can specify that his decision must not be so suspended and in such 
cases it will take effect seven days after the refusal of registration or the 
service of the notice34. 
The Tribunal will consist of a legally qualified chairman and an equal 
number of persons to represent the interests of data users and person to 
represent the interests of data subjects35. Where the Tribunal considers that 
the refusal or notice against which the appeal is brought is not in accordance 
with the law or, to the extent that the refusal or notice involved an exercise of 
discretion by the Registrar, that he ought to have exercised his discretion 
differently, the Tribunal shall allow the appeal or substitute such other 
decision or notice as could have been made or served by the Registrar and in 
any other case it shall dismiss the appeal36. The Tribunal is empowered to 
review any determination of fact on which the refusal or notice in question 
was based, and it can also hear appeals simply against the Registrar's 
statement in a refusal or notice that his decision must take effect as a matter 
of urgency and thus cannot await the outcome of an appeal, such cases 
clearly putting the data user in a very bad light37. It is possible for the 
Registrar or the data user to appeal from the Tribunal on a point of law to 
one of the superior courts, that is the High Court, in England and Wales, the 
Court of Session in Scotland and the High Court in Northern Ireland38. 
The Registrar thus has, in theory, a formidable array of powers but 
before examining them a little more closely it is important to mention 
something about prosecution for offences contrary to the Act and the 
remedies that can be pursued by data subjects as these also have a bearing on 
the effectiveness of enforcement. As is apparent from what has been said, the 
31. S. 12(5). 
32. S. 12(10). 
33. S. 10(5)(b), ll(3)(b)and 12(5)(b). 
34. S. 10(6) and (7), 11(4) and (5) and 12(6) and (7). 
35. S. 3(3)-(6) and Sched. 3, para. 2(1). 
36. S. 14. 
37. S. 14(2)-(4). 
38. S. 14(5). 
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enforcement powers of the Registrar are clearly tied to the criminal sanction ; 
a failure to registrar, operation after deregistration and failure to comply 
with an enforcement or transfer prohibition notices are all criminal offences. 
The power of prosecution is vested in the Registrar or the Director of Public 
Prosecutions " and the fact that the Registrar can back his initial assessment 
that there is or is likely to be a contravention of the data protection 
principles with a criminal prosecution could prove to be an important and 
even decisive incentive to compliance. 
Whether this actually works out in practice will depend very much on 
whether he shows an early willingness to use his muscle in an appropriate 
case ; such a display of force may not actually be forthcoming as formal 
decisions by the Registrar may not be taken for some time, since as shall be 
seen it is certainly intended that he enter into negotiations with data users 
and in any event may not have much choice to do otherwise, and as a refusal 
or a notice is a prerequisite to prosecution the criminal sanction may appear 
less intimidating in practice. It may also be undermined by the staffing 
contraints under which he is likely to operate, at least at the outset. It is 
envisaged that he will only have twenty support staff and given their other 
duties this may not be sufficient40. 
A further problem that prosecutions may give rise to is that this will 
produce another forum in which the Act and the Registrar's exercise of 
power will be examined, although non-compliance is to an extent a factual 
matter. It is not improbable that the validity of the Registrar's acts will be 
impugned and this will not be impermissible, at least where the appellate 
system has not been used. 
The data subject is given a number of specific rights by the Act but, 
apart from inspection of the register itself41, they are to be enforced in the 
ordinary civil courts and not in the Data Protection Tribunal. It may seem 
strange to set up a specialised tribunal, manned by those interested in the 
use of computers, and then not to use it, at least in the first instance, for all 
disputes raising issues of data protection. Of course, it is not uncommon for 
disputes raising fundamentally the same issue of principle but about 
different factual situations to be assigned to different jurisdiction (e.g. 
discrimination in relation to employment is dealt with the industrial 
39. S. 19.(1); persons convicted of any offence under the Act are liable to a fine and the court 
can also order data material connected with the commission of an offence to be forfeited, 
destroyed or erased ; S. 19(2)-(5). 
40. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Eighth Sitting, 1 March 
1984, col. 249. 
41. S. 9. 
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tribunals but in relation to other matters is considered in the County Court) 
but here the difference in forum turns on the question of whether one is the 
data user or data subject. The Tribunal is seen as the preserve of the user and 
the Registrar, and while the proposed amendment that a subject as well as 
the Registrar could appeal against a Tribunal decision in favour of the user 
was rejected on the logical if not convincing ground that the Registrar was 
acting on behalf of the subject and it would be strange to allow the latter an 
appeal42, it would probably have made more sense for the Tribunal to hear 
the claims that the subject is entitled to make. 
Under the Act he is entitled to be informed by any data user whether the 
latter holds data on him, and to have a copy of it42a. A fee can be charged (to 
be fixed by the Secretary of State) and if a user has more than one entry in 
the register then separate requests (and fees) have to be made for each one43. 
The user can require sufficient information to satisfy himself as to the 
identity of the data subject and to be able to locate the data44. He can also 
refuse to give information where it will disclose information about someone 
else, even if it is just that the person is the source45. Otherwise the request 
must be satisfied within 40 days and if a court is satisfied that this has not 
been done, it can order the data user to do so unless it considers that the 
request is unreasonable (e.g. too frequent a demand)46. Having got the 
information a number of other rights might need be exercised. Thus the data 
subject has an action for compensation where he suffers damage by reason of 
the inaccurary of the data, that is it is incorrect or misleading as to any 
matter of fact47. If the data has been obtained from a third person or the 
data subject then compensation is not payable if the data indicates that it 
was so obtained and, where the data user has been so notified, that the data 
subject regards it as incorrect or misleading48. A data user can thus evade the 
responsibility of checking the accuracy of data obtained from others and any 
liability for damages by simply indicating that it was obtained from someone 
else. It is also a defence to prove that one has taken such care as in all the 
circumstances was reasonably required to ensure the data's accuracy at the 
material time49. 
42. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Twelfth Sitting, 15 March 
1984, cols. 391-392. 
42a. S. 21. 
43. S. 21(3). 
44. S. 21(4). 
45. S. 21(4)(b)and(5). 
46. S. 21(6) and (8). The court has the power to inspect the data before making its 
determination but discovery of the data is not available to the data subject ; S. 25(2). 
47. S. 22. 
48. S. 22(2). 
49. S. 22(3). 
544 Les Cahiers de Droit < 1984) 25C.de D. 533 
A data subject can also recover compensation where he suffers loss by 
reason of the loss of the data or the destruction or the disclosure of the data, 
or access having been obtained to the data, without the authority of the data 
user and there is again the defence of all reasonable care being taken50. 
However, the court can order the erasure of the data where it is satisfied that 
there is a substantial risk of further disclosure of or access to the data 
without the user's authority51. Finally, the data subject can apply to the 
court for the rectification or erasure of data that is inaccurate, including any 
expression of opinion which appears to be based on the inaccurate data. 
However, in the case of data obtained from the data subject or a third party 
which complies with the requirements of section 22(2), namely, an indication 
that it was so obtained and that, where appropriate, the data subject regards 
the information as incorrect or misleading, the court may instead make an 
order requiring the data to be supplemented by such statement of true fact, 
relating to the matters dealt with by the data as the court may approve. If the 
requirements of section 22(2) have not been complied with then, instead of 
an order for rectification of erasure, the court can make such order as it 
thinks fit for securing compliance with those requirements, with or without a 
further order requiring the data to be supplemented by a statement of the 
true Facts which it has approved.52 
The range of civil remedies, although greater than that proposed by 
Lindop, does not actually cover all the data protection principles. Thus there 
is no provision for compensating information obtained unlawfully or for 
erasing it. Nor is there provision for compensating or preventing the further 
use of data for an unregistered purpose. Nor for the authorised but improper 
disclosure of information. Nor for dealing with data users whose holding of 
data is not adequate or relevant or is excessive or is held for longer than 
necessary. 
However the Home Office do not seem in any way embarrassed by this ; 
indeed it is claimed that this is an intentional approach to the problem, it 
being felt that the existing civil remedies would cover those situations for 
which no new action is being created and would be entirely adequate for that 
purpose53. The particular actions suggested as useful are defamation, breach 
of confidence and of contract and negligence. This attitude certainly 
50. S. 23. 
51. S. 24(3) ; but in the case of data held by a computer bureau for someone else, the court must 
first take such steps as are reasonably practicable to give that person an opportunity to be 
heard. 
52. S. 24(1) and (2). 
53. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Fifteenth Sitting, 27 
March 1984, cols. 499-500. 
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supports the logic of making the data subject use the ordinary courts but is a 
little disingenuous as the scope of breach of confidence in particular is still 
uncertain and the Law Commission's proposals are not in process of being 
enacted54. Moreover, none of these actions will help deal with problems of 
adequacy, relevance, excessiveness or prolonged retention. It is also a little 
hollow to claim that there is no need for a civil remedy to deal with the 
holding of unregistered data as this is likely to be the beginning of all the 
data subject's problems. However, given that the holding of unregistered 
data is an offence, the data subject might, where the Registrar or the D.P.P. 
is unable or unwilling to prosecute the data user, be able to obtain an 
injunction to restrain its commission ; at least there was some sympathy for 
this in the Gouriet case, where someone has actually suffered injury as a 
result of a breach of the criminal law55. 
In the House of Commons Standing Committee on the Bill there was 
some concern about the absence of any express reference in the provisions 
to compensation for injury to feelings, particularly since the exercise of the 
Registrar's powers were conditioned on the likelihood of damage or distress 
to a data subject but the civil remedies only referred to damage56. At first 
reassurance that the civil law now covers such injury was accepted but at the 
Report stage amendments were adopted allowing anyone suffering damage 
as a result of inaccuracy, loss or unauthorised disclosure or destruction to 
recover both for the damage and any distress suffered57. This formulation is 
designed to prevent the court from being overwhelmed by "speculative" 
actions for distress alone5S. 
It might be desirable to have awards of punitive or exemplary damages, 
particularly in instances where there is oppressive handling or misuse of 
personal data by public officials but given that the sections only create a 
right to compensation this does not seem to be a possibility. 
In the data subject's civil proceedings, information about the data user 
dug up by the Registrar may prove to be most helpful but it will not always 
be available. It will be available where there has been a conviction for 
non-compliance with a notice served by the Registrar but the notice itself, 
despite the inclusion of reasons, is not going to be admissible although future 
54. Breach of Confidence, (Law Com. No. 110) Cmnd. 8388 (1981). 
55. Gouriet v. Union of Post Office Workers, [1978] A.C. 435. 
56. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Fifteenth Sitting, 27 
March 1984, cols. 477-488. 
57. S. 22(1) and 23(1). 
58. H.C. Debs., 5 June 1984, cols. 225-9. Cf. The Race Relations Act 1976, S. 57(4) and the Sex 
Discrimination Act 1975, S. 66(4) which allow compensation to be awarded solely for 
injury to feelings. 
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compliance might be evidence of an earlier default59. This also assumes that 
the Registrar even decides to serve a notice — he may gather evidence but 
decide that a notice is not necessary. It is unlikely that any evidence so 
gathered could be obtained through discovery60. 
Given the incompleteness of the remedies open to data subjects 
themselves and the more general observations that have already been made 
about individuals wanting or being able to track down abuses by data users, 
the Registrar should be the more significant enforcer of the data protection 
principles. As the Home Officer Minister, David Waddington put it, the 
Registrar is the guardian of the data subject61 and it is to a number of 
uncertainties about his powers which must now be further examined. In the 
first place, what exactly does the Act mean by the Registrar being « satisfied » 
about certain matters before exercising his powers? How is he to be 
satisfied ? Closely connected with this is the extent to which the Registrar will 
be able to investigate individual complaints by data subjects and what 
criteria he will use in doing so. Another uncertainty associated with the 
exercise of his powers, is the extent to which the principles of natural justice 
will have to be observed by the Registrar in relation to the data user — there 
is no express provision on this and yet his powers clearly can have a 
considerable impact on the business operations of the data user. Finally, 
arising out of all of these is the extent to which the Registrar's decisions can 
and will be subject to judicial review at the behest of either the data user who 
feels he has gone too far or of the data subject who feels he has not. 
Apart from the Registrar's decision to refuse registration because he 
considers that the proposed particulars do not give sufficient information or 
because he considers that he has insufficient information to satisfy him that 
the data protection principles are unlikely to be contravened, all his powers 
are conditioned upon him being « satisfied » about a certain state of affairs : 
whether it is that the applicant is likely to contravene any of the data 
protection principles or that he has contravened them or that an enforcement 
59. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Sixteenth Sitting, 27 
March 1984, cols. 508-511. 
60. Norwich Pharmacol Co. v. Customs and Excise Commissioners, [1974] A.C. 133 where the 
Registrar's investigations are the result of a complaint his only obligation to the 
complainant is to notify him of his proposed course of action (s. 36(2)) but some 
information might emerge in a challenge to his refusal to take enforcement action ; see 
Part 3 infra. A clause requiring the Registrar to notify data subjects libely to have suffered 
damage by reason of contraventions he has established was resisted as too onerous and 
withdrawn ; House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Twenty-fifth 
Sitting, 26 April 1984, cols: 847-850. 
61. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Twelfth Sitting, 15 March 
1984, col. 391. 
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notice is insufficient to stop further contraventions of them or that a transfer 
of data out of the country is likely to contravene or lead to a contravention 
of those principles. It is fair to assume that « satisfied » for these purposes 
means satisfied on the balance of probabilities as that is generally accepted 
as the appropriate standard for such decisions by administrative bodies but 
this only tells us about the level of evidence for a particular conclusion, and 
it should be said that the Act's provisions are exemplary in requiring the 
Registrar always to give reason to the data user for the conclusions he has 
reached. This requirement of reasons, of course, assumes that the Registrar 
will be able to find reasons and yet this is the very aspect of the Registrar's 
powers on which the Act is virtually silent. There is no express provision 
governing investigations into possible contraventions, except in response to 
individual complaints and in no case can he summon witnesses before him 
upon pain of contempt or even demand documents. That is not say that he 
cannot investigate possible breaches, it is just that his coercive power to do 
so is minimal. The only express power that he is given is tucked away in a 
schedule — a demotion as the original Bill had it in the main body of its 
provisions62. Schedule 4 gives the Registrar certain powers of entry and 
inspection for the purpose of detecting offences and contraventions of the 
data protection principles. He has to satisfy a circuit judge that there are 
reasonable grounds for suspecting an offence or contravention and that 
evidence of it will be found on specified premises and if the judge is satisfied 
a warrant will be issued authorising him or his servants to enter and search 
the premises, to inspect, examine, operate and test any data equipment and 
to seize any documents or other material which might be evidence. However, 
no warrant will be issued, except in cases of urgency or where the object of 
entry would be defeated, unless the Registrar has first given 7 days notice in 
writing to the occupier of the premises demanding access, that access was for 
a reasonable hour and was unreasonably refused and that the occupier has, 
after refusal, been notified by the Registrar of the application for the warrant 
and has had the opportunity of being heard by the judge on the question of 
whether or not it should be issued63. 
Although any power of entry, search and seizure is a considerable 
intrusion of privacy and denotes the importance of the objectives of the body 
so empowered, in the present instance it is remarkable more for the 
politeness of and caution demanded of the Registrar than of any substantive 
power of investigation. In any event, the Registrar is going to need 
information even to go to a circuit judge to get a warrant. Undoubtedly a 
legitimate consideration for the Registrar will be communications that he 
62. CI. 16 of the original Bill. 
63. Schedule 4, para. 2. 
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receives from individual data subjects — but will he be able to rely on these 
alone? He may, of course, ask a data user to comment on allegations that 
have been made to him but the user is not obliged to answer his questions — 
the only time that he is at the renewal of registration. It might well be 
legitimate to refuse renewal on the basis that he had insufficient information 
because the user has not answered allegations from data subjects that have 
been put to him and therefore the Registrar could not be satisfied that the 
user is unlikely to contravene the data protection principles64. 
In respect of the Registrar's other powers, however, it remains to be 
seen whether allegations by data subjects which have not led the Registrar to 
apply for a warrant to search for evidence could alone be sufficient to satisfy 
him of a breach or continued breach of the data protection principles. 
Presumably such allegations would be sufficient to justify a circuit judge 
issuing a warrant but if the Registrar cannot issue enforcement and other 
notices without first obtaining one then the enforcement machinery is going 
to be very slow indeed. This is, however, probably what the Home Office 
intends as there has been much play of the need for the Registrar to negotiate 
and to be flexible, for there to be give and take with the data user. Certainly, 
if the Registrar is going to have to negotiate from this relative position of 
weakness, the data user will not feel stampeded into implementing the data 
protection principles in a hurry. On the other hand, if it were accepted that a 
refusal by a data user to answer an allegation by a data subject could justify 
the Registrar being satisfied then there would be scope for a more assertive 
policy of enforcement. This was the approach the Home Officer Minister 
thought he would take — if the answer to a complaint is unacceptable then 
the Registrar will threaten to serve an enforcement notice — but there is 
clearly going to be scope for disagreement about what is unacceptable and 
thus resort to judicial review65. If the data user were to enter into 
discussions, providing evidence against the allegation then the Registrar 
might find it more difficult to be satisfied unless he was prepared and was 
able to convince a circuit judge to give him a warrant to search for evidence 
in the user's premises. 
It is possible that action by the Registrar will always be prompted by 
communications from data subjects, but given that many of them will not be 
aware of the files kept on them it is even more unlikely that they will be 
64. S. 7(2) (c). A clause imposing a duty on the data user to furnish information required by the 
Registrar was considered to threaten the privilege against self-incrimination ; House of 
Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, Twenty-fifth Sitting, 26 April 1984, 
cols. 850-854. 
65. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, First Sitting, 19 April 
1983, col. 17. 
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aware of the abuses that might be occurring. It will be important for the 
Registrar, therefore, to act on his own initiative and indeed he is under a 
duty to so perform his functions so as to promote the observance of the data 
protection principles66. It must be open to him therefore to investigate 
possible abuses without complaints but he still lacks any coercive powers of 
investigation. Negotiations and discussions with data users may yield some 
useful information but it is doubtful whether it will be sufficient in many 
cases. Whether it would be permissible to employ « undercover» operatives 
in the manner of investigative journalists as a way of becoming satisfied 
remains to be seen. 
The investigation of individual cases is likely to be a major source of 
information for the Registrar but there was no specific provision relating to 
this in either of the Bills introduced into parliament. Although the government 
always accepted that the Registrar would actually investigate complaints by 
individuals, it was perhaps understandable that, in view of the limited staff 
with which he would be provided, there was a great reluctance to put him 
under any duty to dose67. Proposed amendments to include such a duty were 
defeated, but, sensing the pressure for some hind of duty, the government 
moved and had accepted the clause that is now section 36(2)68. This allows 
the Registrar to consider complaints about breaches of the Act and requires 
him to do so « if the complaint appears to him to raise a matter of substance 
and to have been made without undue delay by a person directly affected». 
Of course the object of an investigation will not be a remedy for the 
particular complainant but the more general observance of the data protection 
principles, but the damage or distress to a data subject is a relevant 
consideration. A more general comment about the Registrar's investigations 
is that given the information about individuals being harmed which may be 
discovered by the Registrar, it is regrettable that the proceedings for an 
enforcement notice, etc. cannot at the same time provide compensation for 
those data subjects who have already been proved to have suffered loss. 
There would, however, still have to be a separate remedy for other data 
subjects similarly affected but whose injury was not discovered untill the 
enforcement proceedings. 
Another matter on which the provisions of the Act offer little guidance 
is the actual obligation of disclosure imposed on the Registrar with respect to 
the data user before he takes enforcement action against him. This is an 
important concern given the way in which the CRE's activities have been 
66. S. 36. 
67. House of Commons Standing Committee H, Data Protection Bill, First Sitting, 19 April 
1983, cols. 16-17. 
68. H.C. Debs., 5 June 1984, cols. 235-236. 
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hampered by procedural requirements that had not been fully understood 
until the intervention of the courts. In the Data Protection Act there are none 
of the detailed preconditions to be found in the Race Relations Act but that 
doesn't mean that natural justice requirements are not relevant. All the 
decisions of the Registrar (whether refusal or non-renewal of registration or 
enforcement or deregistration) will have a serious effect on the livelihood of 
the data user ; it will make his activities henceforth a criminal offence unless 
he takes the appropriate action and even that may require expense. We know 
that he has to have reasons for his decision — to be able to justify his 
satisfaction — and that he has to give them to the data and given that in 
general the decisions of the Registrar are suspended pending an appeal, it 
could be argued that this is all that the Registrar needs to do ; the whole 
matter can then be argued out at the Tribunal. However, an appeal with 
natural justice is rarely a substitute for an initial decision in breach of the 
principles of natural justice69 and the Registrar's decision, albeit suspended, 
is still likely to have an impact on the data user, if only to discourage people 
dealing with him. The Registrar is going to be a person of distinction and his 
decisions will therefore be treated with the appropriate respect ; the stain on 
the data user's character if nothing else could be formidable. Moreover, if 
the Registrar is only to act if satisfied, how can he be satisfied unless he has 
also heard the data user's side? If there is then a duty of disclosure, then the 
Registrar may have to reveal at least the substance of complaints by data 
subjects and it may be difficult for the data user to have an opportunity to 
rebut them without knowing the details of the case. If, therefore, the 
Registrar acts without giving the data user an opportunity to explain, he is 
likely to find his decisions being challenged in an application for judicial 
review by the data user. 
3. The Scope for Judicial Review of the Registrar's Decisions 
Judicial review might also be resorted to by the data user to challenge 
decisions of the Registrar on other grounds also, for example, that the 
reasons given could not justify the conclusion that there has been or is likely 
to be a breach of the data protection principles or that the steps required to 
be taken in an enforcement notice or in a transfer prohibition notice are 
perhaps unreasonable or go further than is necessary to secure compliance 
with the data protection principles. These complaints by a data user could, 
of course, equally be ventilated through the appeal system on the basis that 
the decision is not in accordance with the law. But although in some areas 
the Divisional Court might be reluctant to interfere where there is also a 
69. Ridge v. Baldwin, [1964] A.C. 40. 
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right of appeal, it has already stated in relation to non-discrimination notices 
served by the CRE that it would be prepared to grant judicial review of such 
a notice if it were satisfied that as a matter of law the notice should never 
have been served and there was no dispute on the facts even though there 
had not yet been an appeal to an industrial tribunal70 and it is probable that 
a similar approach would be taken with respect to decisions and notices 
emanating from the Registrar. 
Data subjects may also be interested in challenging the decisions of the 
Registrar not only because his powers cover matters for which there are no 
civil remedies or at least they are uncertain, but also because an investigation 
by the Registrar could in some cases be an essential preliminary to a civil 
action by the data subject himself. However it is unlikely that data subjects 
would always be able to compel the Registrar to take action against a 
particular data user or even to investigate the data subject's complaint. The 
only duty expressly imposed on the Registrar is to investigate those 
complaints « which appear to him to raise a matter of substance and to have 
been made without undue delay by a person directly affected71 ; otherwise he 
is not required to act even where he is satisfied that there is or is likely to be a 
breach of the data protection principles by the particular data user. The 
subjective wording of the terms in which the duty to investigate is laid upon 
the Registrar will undoubtedly leave him some discretion about which 
complaint he should actually investigate. Nevertheless, case-law defining « a 
matter of substance», «undue delay» and «a person directly affected» 
(which in most, it not all, cases must be a data subject suffering damage as a 
result of a disregard of the data protection principles) can be expected and 
the Registrar's discretion will not be open-ended. Even in those cases where 
section 36(2) does not impose a duty on the Registrar, successful challenges 
to the exercise of his powers, or more likely his failure to exercise them, are 
not out of the question. Certainly if the Registrar adopts policies about when 
he will and when he will not investigate individual cases, he may find his 
refusals to do so in particular cases open to the challenge that he had failed 
to exercise his discretion — although given the size of his staff, and the terms 
of section 36(2) there is likely to be some judicial sympathy for some kind of 
policy restricting the number of complaints he takes on board. Nevertheless, 
there can be no doubt that, given that his function is to be guardian of the 
data subject, individual data subjects would have a sufficient interest to 
challenge any refusal to investigate, based on a policy that is too restrictive. 
More problematical, however, is perhaps the situation where the data 
subject's complaint has been investigated and the Registrar is satisfied that 
70. R. v. Commission for Racial Equality, ex p. Westminster City Council, [1984] I.R.L.R. 230. 
71. S. 36(2). 
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there has been or is likely to be a contravention of the data protection 
principles. That state of satisfaction does not mean he has to act but 
enforcement action in the long term may be of more value to data subjects 
than pursuing their civil remedies and section 36(2) implicity recognizes this 
by the obligation to notify a complainant of « any action which he proposes 
to take » having investigated a complaint. The Registrar's discretion exists to 
allow him flexibility; the possibility of securing change by negotiation. 
Should and could his hand be forced by the data subjects who are not 
prepared to accept this gentlemanly approach to remedying breaches of the 
data protection principles? It is at least arguable that if the Registrar is 
satisfied of a breach or likely breach, then there will be cases where failure to 
take enforcement action does reflect a failure to properly exercise his 
discretion — after all relevant factors for all his powers are the damage or 
distress that may have been caused to data subjects and as far as, for 
example, the deregistration power is concerned, it may well be a flagrant case 
of closing one's mind if the Registrar persists in negotiation when there has 
been no effort at all to comply with an enforcement notice and prosecution 
has not led to any change of behaviour. 
If the Registrar's decisions are challenged in this way through judicial 
review, it is possible that allegations of breaches of the data protection 
principles will be considered in three or even four different fora. Thus there 
could be appeals by the data user against enforcement action to the 
Tribunal ; civil proceedings brought by the data subject ; criminal proceedings 
against the data user ; and applications for judicial review instigated by the 
data subject and/or the data user. This situation is possibly overcomplex and 
may prove to be an unnecessary hindrance to the Registrar's work, 
particularly as the increased use of computerisation means that its volume 
will grow rather than diminish. 
